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Abstract—We propose the proxy threshold signature scheme
with the application of elegant construction of verifiable delegat-
ing key in the ID-based infrastructure, and also with the bilinear
pairings. The protocol satisfies the classical security requirements
used in the proxy delegation of signing rights. The description
of the system architecture and the possible application of the
protocol in edge computing designs is enclosed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
INTERNET of Things (IoT) is a term that describes oneof the newer concepts of telecommunications systems [20],
[19]. It consists in connecting material objects with each other
and with Internet resources by means of an extensive computer
network. The IoT concept includes not only devices (with
which you can communicate), but of course also telephones
and computers, which are currently the largest group of items
included in this structure. In general, IoT contains any element
that can be linked to the World Wide Web framework [6].
These can be all modules included in smart homes (e.g.
household appliances, heating installation, lighting, counters,
and clocks). Let’s not forget about the automotive market and
cars. Sensors and their readers, such as those used in industry,
trade, or transport can also be part of the telecommunication
IoT. Cloud edge computing provides the convenience of using
the cloud on edge networks. Edge clouds are hosted by
microdata centers that store and process data much faster than
is possible with a data center connection. Edge servers function
as data processing micro-centers, providing the computing
power for the edge cloud.
Blockchain is a decentralized and distributed database in an
open source Internet model with a peer-to-peer architecture
without central computers and no centralized place for data
storage. It is used used for accounting for individual transac-
tions, payments, or journal entries encoded with cryptographic
algorithms [22], [23], [13]. The design of efficient and secure
protocols, that enable the interaction of IoT devices with
the core of blockchain networks, is a promising and rapidly
evolving research area. This would have the effect of pushing
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the IoT devices out of the edge of the blockchain network,
leading, again, to the centralization of operations.
In the described information processing model, the follow-
ing hierarchical trust structure is possible. At the top of this
hierarchy, we can distinguish cloud computing from the Au-
thorization Center, which issues digital certificates to trusted
entities. Below, in the text, we have considered the main
players in the game (e.g. Companies that trade in electricity
and supply it to end users). In this case, the infrastructure
based on a distributed register (it would be responsible for the
monitoring system) can be treated as a channel of common
communication between different players in the scenario under
consideration. At the same time, groups of sensors transmit
information (on the level of energy consumption) to the
company’s servers. Such recorded events are the basis for
issuing bills. As usual, the end-user pays electronic bills for
energy consumption. This process can be realized with the
application of smart contracts technology. Now, let us consider
a group of sensors (in a large company or farm). It is possible
to imagine that a trusted module (communication gate) is
designated for a given group of sensors for acquisition and
secure data transmission to the billing center. Such a module
may receive a power of attorney to sign (sign as a proxy) the
submitted measurement results. In this case, the issuer of the
power of attorney is the company’s headquarters. It is possible
that a group of such measurement networks will be considered.
Only then, their joint cooperation will allow the measurement
results to be signed as a group. Hence, it seems reasonable to
consider the possibility of confirming such a signature by an
entity delegated to this task in the company’s headquarters.
II. THE PROBLEM SPECIFICATION
The problem of delegation of signing rights appears quite
frequently in the literature, in particular within the so called
group oriented society [4], [18]. In this paper, we deal with
the ID-based signature scheme (see e.g. [15] for the scheme
based on the bilinear pairings). Let us remark, that ID-based
signatures are especially interesting when the efficient key
management is required. In this setting, the bilinear pairings
are the key point to obtain the elegant and computationally
effective protocols with security based on the related Compu-
tational and Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problems (see [1], [7]).
Let us also remind, that the first construction of the Gap Diffie-
Hellman (GDH) group was proposed in [9], while in [2] and
[11] the first examples of the digital signatures working in the
GDH group were given.
In what follows we propose a new model of the ID-based
proxy, threshold signature scheme. In contrast to the solution
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presented in [7], here U0 computes the delegating secret for
arbitrary group UG of type ksQID := ksQ0 with the related
verification key equal to Pver = Pver(k) = ksP , where k is
a random element of Z∗q . The idea is the following: Let U0 be
a user with identity ID in the ID-based infrastructure with
the trusted party PKG (Private Key Generator) having the
master key s and the related public key sP . The verification
key Pver is approved by computing the commitment kP which
serves as a proof of correctness of the related verification key
e(ksP, P ) = e(kP, sP ).
Let I = Ik, where:
Ik = (ksP, kP )
and
C = C(k, x, ID) = xQ0 + h(Ik)ksQ0.
Applying the idea of [7], we propose the following delegated
signature of U0 of the form: σ(m) = (A(m), B(x), C, I) on
the message m.
Here a random value x is verifiably distributed by U0
among the members of UG with the aid of the interpolating
polynomial of degree t with constant term equal to x = xID.
Let us also remark that the members Ui do not require the
use of pseudo-random number generator for the derandomized
Weil pairing computation [17]. It is worth saying that deter-
ministic algorithms besides the theoretical interest also allow
to reduce the computations complexity.
The above signing rights delegation is not applicable in
the more narrow sense of signing rights delegation called the
proxy signature, since then the related requirements (security
conditions) are not satisfied (see the last two of them below).
We propose to remedy this inconvenience applying the identi-
fication of the signers of the proxy group and the application
of the related multisignature computed by the qualified set of
users.
Therefore, we maintain the concept of computing x = xID
by U0 and verifiable distribution of it among the group UG
members. However, now the private inputs xi of the signers
Ui, i ≥ 1 forming the qualifed subgroup UG′ ⊂ UG contained
in part E of the signature σ(m) = (A(m), B(x), C,E, Ik,w,t)
unable U0 to forge the proxy signature on behalf of some
Ui, nor the actual proxy signer can deny that he has signed
the message m. Here I = Ik,w,t contains additionally the
information about the delegation of signing rights (warrant)
and (optionally) the threshold value t. Concluding, the proxy
signature (with the identification of signers belonging to the
actual, qualified subgroup UG′ ⊂ UG) will satisfy the
required security conditions. The value E = E(UG′) is in
fact the related multisignature [8] performed by the the actual
proxy signers on the message containing the delegation data
and description of UG′.
III. RELATED WORK FOR THE PROXY SIGNATURES
The proxy signatures were invented in order to keep the
reliability and the continuity of services in electronic com-
munication, when we require to delegate the signing rights
to other users satisfying the security conditions pointed out
below. Here a designated person or group of persons is able
to sign the document on behalf of the original signer such that
only the proxy signers can create the valid signature and any
verifier can be convinced about the original signer’s agreement
on the signed message. One can distinguish two basic types
of proxy signature schemes: partial delegation or delegation
by warrant [10].
The warrant is used by the proxy signers to convince
any user of their signing delegation power. Such a signature
scheme can be used in the delegation of rights to sign messages
without relying on any physical device. The delegation by a
warrant may be implemented by ordinary signature schemes
working in the ID-based public-key cryptosystem.
Formally, the proxy signature was introduced by: Mambo,
Usuda, and Okamoto [12]. The proxy delegation by warrant
approach was presented in [14] and [21]. The threshold
signature schemes were first considered in [4] and [5].
IV. COMMUNICATION MODEL AND SIGNING RIGHTS
DELEGATION
We distinct the set of parties: U0, U1, ..., Un. Let U0 is the
original signer and UG = {U1, ..., Un} is called the group of
delegating signers. We assume that U0 has identity ID and the
related private key DID = sQID := sQ0 and the delegation
secret key equal to Dproxy = ksQ0.
In case of proxy signature, we assume that all parties:
{U0, U1, ..., Un} have their identities ID(j), j = 0, 1, 2..., n
in the ID-based infrastructure with the given trusted party
PKG. The qualified set of members sign any message m on
behalf of the original signer U0. Below, we first present the
ID-based delegation of signing rights based on the protocol
investigated in [7] and then ID-based, threshold, proxy sig-
nature scheme (with identification of group signers).
We recall that the private key of the signer is composed
of two ingredients forming the pair (x,Dproxy), where the
second term is a variation of the private key DID of the signer
U0 multiplied by a random factor k, while the first is a secret
being distributed by U0 among the group of users UG. The
variation is in fact equal to:
Dk,w = Dk,w(ID)
= h(Ik,w,t)Dproxy = h(Ik,w,t)ksQ0.
The delegated signature has the form:
sigma(m) = (A(m), B(x), C(k,w, t)),
where:
A(m) = xH(ID,m), B(x) = xP,
and
C(k,w, t) = (xQ0 +Dk,w, kP ).
V. PROXY SIGNING
In the proxy signing, the final signature contains additionally
the extended information: Ik,w,t together with the identities
of the actual set of signers UG′. Moreover, it contains the
approval E of the delegation of rights by the group mem-
bers Ui, hence now, the role of Dk,w above is played by
DUG′(ID) = h(Ik,w,t)Dproxy , with UG′ ⊂ UG being the
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subgroup of UG taking part in the collective signing on the
message M = (m,w, t, UG′) (attention: M is not m).
The final proxy signature under the message m has the form:
(A(m), B(x), Cproxy, Ik,w,t, B̄, E),
where: A(m), B(x) are defined above, while B̄ = (B1, .., Bl),
Bi = xiP , for: 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
Cproxy = Cproxy(ID,UG
′) = xQID +DUG′(ID),




Ai(M) = xiH(σ(M), ID(i)),
and
σ(M) = (A(M), B(x), C(k,w, t))
and B = xIDP with the related terms described above.
VI. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROXY
SIGNATURE
In the paper, we assume that the proxy signatures are
generated by the subgroups of UG. In fact, the proxy signature
is combined from the partial proxy signatures computed by
the corresponding proxy signers belonging to some subgroup
UG′ ⊂ UG. The computational security of the proxy signature
scheme requires the following conditions to be satisfied:
Distinguishable: Proxy signature is distinguishable from
the original signer signature.
Proxy-protected: No-one but the proxy signer can generate
the corresponding partial proxy signature.
Secrecy: The original signer’s private key cannot be derived
from any information available for the proxy signers even if
they collude together.
Unforgeable: No valid proxy signature should keep an
honest signer as accountable for it if he did not participate
in signing.
Non repudiation: Neither the original signer cannot deny
having delegated the power of signing messages to the proxy
signers nor the actual proxy signer can deny that he has signed
the message.
VII. THE PROTOCOL
The bilinear structure is given by:
e : G1 ×G2 → G.
The PKG’s public parameters is the tuple:
PT = (G1, G2, G, e, q, P, Ppub, H, h)
and its master secret is s ∈ Z∗q . Here: H : {0, 1}∗ → G1 and
P ∈ G2.
The basic protocol consists of the following algorithms
(phases): Setup, ProxyExtract, ProxyDelegate, ProxyKeyshare,
ProxySign, Verify. They are described below.
Setup: This algorithm output is the public tuple PT and
the secret master key s as above.
ProxyExtract: In this phase, the original signer U0 with
identity ID0 first selects a random k ∈ Z∗q , computes the com-
mitment K = kP and Ik = (ksP, kP ). Finally U0 computes
the value Dproxy = ksQID0 , where QID0 = H1(ID0).
ProxyDelegate: Let w be a warrant (set of identities IDi
for proxy signers UG = {U1, ..., Un}) delegating the signing
rights of U0 for the set of proxy signers UG). The original
signer computes the value:
Dk,w,t(ID0) = h(Ik,w,t)Dproxy,
where: Ik,w,t = (Ik, w, t) and t is defined below. Then w and
Dk,w,t(ID0) is sent to the proxy group UG.
ProxyKeyshare: In this phase, U0 selects randomly xID
and the interpolating polynomial f (of degree t−1) such that:





The value f(i) := xID,i is sent by a secure channel to the
member Ui of proxy group UG, together with the related com-
mitments for the coefficients of the interpolating polynomial
aiP , for i = 1, 2, ..., n. The correctness of the related shares
are verified by the group UG members (see [7]). Finally, U0
computes the values B = BID = xIDP and
Cproxy(ID) = xIDQID +Dk,w,t(ID) =
= xIDQID + h(Ik,w,t)Dproxy.
Proxysign: Let m be a message to be signed by the proxy
group UG. Each member of UG computes the related value
Ai(m) = xID,iPm, where: Pm = H(ID0,m). Let UG′ be
the subset of actual proxy signers that takes part in the signing
process. In the first part, every member of UG′ selects xi ∈ Z∗q
uniformly at random and verifies the correctness of the value
Ai(m) with the aids of the commitments aiP (see [7]). After
its positive verification every member Ui of UG′ computes
the value:
A′i(M) := xiPM = xiH(ID0,M),
where: M = (m,w, t, UG′) and broadcasts it in UG′. Every
member of UG′ verifies the correctness of the related values
applying the bilinearity of e and the value of Bi = xiP .
The complete signature of UG′ under the message m is the
tuple:
(A(m), B(x), Cproxy, Ik,w,t, B̄, E),
where:
x = xID0 , A(m) = xPm,
B(x) = xP
and
Cproxy(ID0, UG) = xQ0 +Dk,w,t(ID0) =
xQID0 + h(Ik,w,t)Dproxy.
Here: B̄ = (B1, ..., Bl), where: Bi = xiP . Finally,
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where the value of A′i(y) is defined above, σ(M) =
(A(M), B(x), Cproxy) and A(M) = H(ID,M).
Verify: Let σ = (A,B,Cproxy, Ik,w,t, B̄, E), be the signa-
ture on the message m with delegation approved by U0 of
identity ID0.
An arbitrary verifier checks the equalities:
e(A,P ) = e(Pm, B)
and
e(Cproxy, P ) = e(xQID + h(Ik,w,t)ksQID0 , P ),
what is equal to:
= e(QID0 , h(Ik,w,t)Pver +B),
where: Pm = H(m, ID0) and Pver = ksP . If so, then
he checks the correctness of the approvals A′i(M) verifying
finally the equality:














The security analysis refers to the security requirements
defined above. The distinguishability and proxy-protected con-
dition are clear since the private key U0 is equal sQ0, while
his delegating key is equal to Dproxy = ksQ0, for a random
k ∈ Z∗q . The proxy protected condition follows from the
approval xiH(σ(M)) computed by the proxy signer Ui. The
original signer’s U0 private key sQ0 is not known to anyone
of the users Ui, i ≥ 1, hence the secrecy condition is satisfied.
The proof of participation of the user Ui in the signature
(A,B,C, Ik,w,t, B̄, E) is based on his approval Bi contained
in B̄ and xiH(σ(ID0,M)) contained in the signature E,
hence the unforgeability condition is satisfied. Finally, the
delegating user U0 can not deny having delegated the power
of signing to the proxy group since since his delegating key
Dproxy = ksQ0 can be approved by the verification key
Pver = ksP . Together with the approval of Ui equal to
xiH(ID0,M) this shows the validity of the non-repudiation
security condition.
IX. IMPLEMENTATION
The proof of concept implementation was prepared as a
script using Python programming language. The code was
organized into classes describing parties taking part in our
communication model which are then instantiated into objects.
The communication process between these objects is then
simulated accordingly to the protocol described above. There
are four classes: PKG, User, ProxySigner, Verifier, which
are instantiated into four sets of protocol parties (PKG,
Original Signer, Proxy Signers and Verifier). The additional
PublicBoard class was also designed and instantiated as an
object storing signature and corresponding data that is suffi-
cient to verify the validity of the signature. It was decided to
create separate classes User, and Proxy Signer as it improves
the clarity of code and is more suitable in the context of
IoT with a hierarchical structure. It should be however noted
that in the context of blockchain with decentralized peer-to-
peer architecture, one user could be acting simultaneously as
Original Signer and Proxy Signer depending on the process.
The communication between parties is presented in Figure 1.
—————————————————————————
—————————————————————————
Fig. 1. System architecture
The simulation starts with PKG generating public param-
eters:
(G1, G2, G, e, q, P, Ppub, H, h),
which are then used by an Original Signer U0 to calculate the
verification key Pver, the commitment K, delegation secret
key: Dproxy, warrant w along with the Dk,w,t parameter, as
described in section 7. Next, U0 creates interpolating polyno-
mial f , calculates UG shares xID,i along with aiP which are
immediately distributed among proxy signers (xID,i = f(i), ai
are the coefficients of the polynomial f ). After computing B
and Cproxy, the values of: B,Cproxy, Ik,w,t, xID,i and aiP are
sent to each Ui, for i = 1, 2, . . . n. After receiving these values,
each Ui calculates Ai and sends it among other members of
UG′ group. Then, each Ui calculates A and E before sending
the complete signature (A,B,Cproxy, Ik,w,t, E) to U0. Con-
sistently, after receiving the complete signature from every
member of UG′ group, U0 sends the one of these signatures
to Verifier who checks if the signature was computed correctly
and can be trusted.
An open-source version of the described proof of
concept protocol is available on the internet (see repository:
https://github.com/blaziu1/bilinear wallet/blob/main/bilinear
wallet.py).
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X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed the proxy threshold sig-
nature scheme with the application of elegant construction of
verifiable delegating key in the ID-based infrastructure. The
protocol satisfies the classical security requirements used in
the proxy delegation of signing rights. In our construction, we
used the bilinear pairings concept. We enclose in the article,
the description of the system architecture and the possible
application of the protocol in edge computing designs. The
presented protocol can be extended for the family of proxy
groups generated by a given user for the threshold proxy
signatures schemes [16].
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